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Most existing empirical evidence on the impact of profit taxation on multinational firm 
activity is based on cross-country data. One major drawback of such data is that countries 
differ not only with regard to taxes but along other dimensions which might be hard to capture 
by means of observable characteristics. We compile a database of more than 11,000 
municipalities in Germany to analyze the sensitivity of the location decisions of foreign 
MNEs with respect to business tax rates which are levied directly by the municipalities. Using 
count data models suited for cross-sectional and panel data, we find that higher business tax 
rates have a negative effect on the number of foreign MNE headquarters, after controlling for 
other determinants of firm location decisions. On average, a one-percent reduction of the 
municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a decline by about 0.14 percentage points) leads to 
an increase in the number of headquarters of foreign MNEs by about 0.05. Hence, the average 
municipality needs to reduce its business tax rate by 20% to attract one foreign MNE. 
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A sizeable literature in theoretical public nance argues that the location of
capital in general and that of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in particular
reacts sensitively to prot tax policy (Wilson, 1987; Janeba, 1995; Huizinga
and Nielsen, 1997; Hauer and Wooton, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Ludema and
Wooton, 2000; Davies, 2003, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard, 2003; Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004; Ra, 2004; Borck and P uger, 2006; Bucovetsky and
Hauer, 2008; by no means, this list is exhaustive). When lumpy investment
{ i.e., rm or plant location { is sensitive to prot taxation, many of these
models predict a race to the bottom in prot tax rates so that, in equilibrium,
countries have to oer a prot tax rate of zero to attract investors. Otherwise,
a jurisdiction will lose the whole prot tax base to its competitors. One key
reason for this outcome is that { in most of the traditional models of tax
competition { countries dier only in terms of prot taxes or, more precisely,
low prot taxes are the only attraction governments may oer to rms.
Empirically, there is hardly any evidence of a race to the bottom in prot
taxes (except for the existence of a few small tax havens). Therefore, recent
theoretical work suggested mechanisms to avoid the knife-edge case of a race
to the bottom in tax rates. The New Economic Geography literature hy-
pothesizes that there are factors generating agglomeration economies which,
in turn, reduce the sensitivity of location decisions of foreign MNEs with
respect to prot (or capital) taxation (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004; Borck and P uger, 2006). More generally, taxes are
only one factor aecting rm location. There is little reason for a munici-
pality to eliminate prot taxes provided that the overall environment { e.g.
available infrastructure and human capital endowment of the work force {
makes it attractive enough to locate there.
It is by now well documented in empirical research at various levels of
aggregation (rms, industries, and aggregate bilateral activity) that the lo-
cation of MNE activity across countries inter alia depends on national prot
tax policy (Devereux and Grith, 1998; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006,
2009; Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Grubert and Mutti, 2004; Huizinga and
Nicod eme, 2006; Egger, Pfaermayr, Loretz, and Winner, 2008; Overesch
and Wamser, 2008). However, there are two concerns with previous work.
First, for some countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, the (unique)
prot tax rate is an artifact, since tax authorities at the sub-national level
may determine taxes on prots in their jurisdiction. Second, countries dier
2in many ways rather than only in prot taxes, most importantly with regard
to institutional characteristics that are hard to measure. Omission of relevant
institutional determinants of MNE activity is likely in cross-country studies
and may bias empirical estimates of the sensitivity of MNE activity with
respect to taxation and other variables. Both problems can be avoided when
considering rm location decisions at the sub-national level. Of course, a
prerequisite for this is the existence of sub-national jurisdictions which dier
with regard to prot tax rates.
There is a small literature on the nexus between rm births (national and
foreign rms) and taxation which focuses on location decisions across regions
within a country. For instance, Slemrod (1990; analyzing direct investments
in 50 U.S. states by home country) Papke (1991; exploiting information across
22 U.S. states), Hines (1996; analyzing foreign direct investment in 50 U.S.
states by home country), List (2001; using 58 Californian counties), and
Br uhlhart, Jametti, and Schmidheiny (2007; focusing on 213 large Swiss
municipalities) belong here. Of these studies, only Slemrod (1990), Hines
(1996), and List (2001) focus on the location decisions of foreign rms (i.e.,
foreign MNEs) explicitly and, hence, ask questions which are comparable to
ours. List (2001) analyzes the impact of the per-capita property tax rate on
MNEs rather than a prot tax burden which is directly levied on businesses.
Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) are interested not only in the impact of
state-level corporate tax rates in the U.S. but also at the role of the system of
double taxation relieve in the recipient countries. Apart from the dierences
in the research questions posed in this paper as compared to the papers just
mentioned, the number of jurisdictions (i.e., the number of host locations)
which we can analyze is larger than in previous work by more than one order
of magnitude.
We compile a large data-set on local business tax rates1 and other data
at the municipality level. Our data covers more than 11;000 German mu-
nicipalities over the period 2001 to 2005. We link this data-set with data
on the location of the German headquarters of foreign MNEs.2 The set of
1These business tax rates are set directly by municipalities, and they apply to the
prots of all rms in a jurisdiction. For exceptions, see x3 of the German business tax law
(Gewerbesteuergesetz GewStG).
2The work of Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) blends home country and host juris-
diction issues with corporate taxation. Unlike them, we do not distinguish foreign MNEs
according to their country of origin. We prefer to focus on the responsiveness of MNE
location (from anywhere) to host jurisdiction business tax rates for two reasons. First, we
3locations (municipalities) considered here is much more homogeneous than
in cross-country data. For instance, in contrast to an international setting,
other tax parameters such as taxes on income are identical across German
municipalities since they are levied at the level of the federal union. More-
over, sub-national data allow one to control for the heterogeneity of locations
within countries which is more dicult with national data.
The location of regional headquarters is important because they are typi-
cally tied to the main production plants in the same municipality. Attracting
a regional headquarters of a foreign MNE to a municipality thus promises
jobs and local business tax income. There is anecdotal evidence of munici-
palities which lower their tax rates so as to explicitly attract foreign rms.
One well-known example is the small town of Holzkirchen, close to Munich
in Upper Bavaria, that lowered its business tax rate to appeal to Sandoz, a
big pharmaceutical rm.3 Another example constitutes the municipality of
Amering which managed to lure Kathrein, the world leader in satellite dishes,
to locate its headquarters there, by lowering its local business tax rate.4 We
would be able to provide further examples, but these are enough to illustrate
how local business tax rates may aect a rm's location choice.
The majority of municipalities in Germany does not attract any foreign
headquarters, however. This could be to do with (high) business tax rates
as well as other factors. We will argue that (low) business tax rates alone
are not enough to attract foreign headquarters for the average municipality.
Econometrically, the fact that numerous municipalities are incapable of at-
tracting any foreign MNE headquarters suggests that the problem of interest
may not be approached appropriately by a linear regression model. More-
over, many of the municipalities which successfully attract foreign MNEs
are interested in how a given number of foreign investments to just one country (Germany)
is allocated within the country in response to tax rates. Hence, we disregard multilateral
considerations of investors { e.g., decisions related to whether invest in Germany at all.
Second, the huge number of host jurisdictions involves a relatively large fraction of munic-
ipalities where no investment is undertaken at all. The fraction of zeros would necessarily
rise more than proportionately if we distinguished the number of investors by their country
of origin. This would call into question the applicability of some of the methods applied
here. Hence, we have to relegate questions related to the origin of foreign investments
with this data-set to another paper.
3See http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/10/51958/ reporting that
Holzkirchen had lowered its local business tax rate by 30 percent, making it the
second-lowest in the state of Bavaria, in its (successful) attempt to attract Sandoz.
4See http://www.kathrein.de/de/presse/cont/texte2005/pi0553.htm.
4host only a small number of headquarters. Therefore, we employ count data
models to estimate the impact of business taxation on the number of foreign
MNE headquarters located in a municipality, controlling for other determi-
nants such as population characteristics, the skill level of the work force, and
geographical characteristics. More specically, we estimate cross-sectional
and panel data models, where business tax rates are treated as exogenous
or endogenous. Across the board, we identify a negative impact of business
tax rates on the number of MNE headquarters in a municipality which is
signicantly dierent from zero. The magnitude of the impact seems reason-
able: a reduction of one percent of the municipal tax rate is related to an
increase in the expected number of headquarters hosted by the municipality
of about 450% in the preferred model. For the average municipality, the lat-
ter is equivalent to an increase in the number of foreign MNE headquarters
by 0:05. In other words, the average municipality would have to lower its
business tax rate by about 20% (or 2:8 percentage points) to attract only
one headquarters of a foreign MNE. When accounting for the endogeneity of
tax rates the marginal impact of business taxation is somewhat higher.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize the
literature on determinants of regional headquarters in section 2. Section 3
describes features of the data-set. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy
for the analysis of the impact of business taxes on the number of MNE
headquarters in a municipality. Section 5 summarizes the empirical ndings
from both cross-section and panel data analysis. The last section provides
some concluding remarks.
2 Determinants of MNE regional headquar-
ters location
In our empirical analysis, we estimate parsimonious models of the number
of regional headquarters set up in German municipalities. As suggested by
previous research on the impact of prot (or capital) taxation on lumpy
investment decisions by MNEs, we expect higher business tax rates levied
by municipalities to exert a negative impact on the number of headquarters.
However, to isolate their role on MNEs' location decisions, we have to control
for other key explanatory variables suggested by the literature. These are
the following.
5According to a sizable body of work in theoretical international eco-
nomics, knowledge-capital embodied in skilled workers is one of the key
determinants of MNE activity (see Markusen, 2002). In accordance with
that line of reasoning, empirical research identied a key role of the local
supply of skilled labor to play for the set-up of MNE headquarters (see Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies,
and Head, 2003). While previous evidence is available for investment (and
foreign aliate sales) at the national level, similar arguments ought to hold
for headquarters location within a country. Our skill measure is the share of
workers with tertiary school education.
A second key factor determining MNE activity according to previous re-
search is host country location size (see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004). Using country (or country-pair) data in previous empirical
work, host country location size is typically controlled for by variables based
on gross domestic product (GDP). However, GDP is not available (as well as
endogenous) at regionally very disaggregated levels. For this reason, in our
preferred specication, we include population density, the independency ratio
of the population (i.e., the number of people aged between 15 and 65 years as
a fraction of total population in the region) and geographical area.5 Notice
that { once including log geographical area as well { we may interpret the
coecient of log population density as reecting the elasticity with respect
to population size. The independency ratio is the best measure available to
capture the relative size of the working-age population in a region. Including
log area along with population density also approximates land prices and
provides a measure of the relative abundance of land as such, which may be
used relatively intensively in some of the sectors MNEs operate in.6;7
5One might think of distance to a metropolitan area as a further possible determinant.
However, this is highly correlated with geographical area and population in the cross-
section, and it is wiped out by the method applied with panel data. Therefore, we do not
include this variable.
6There are various ways of specifying these inuences. For instance, it turns out that
including log population and log area obtains similar results to the ones with the preferred
specication, where we use population density and log area. Similarly, using the area
covered with buildings and streets (instead of log total geographical area) along with the
log share of area reserved for building obtains similar results. However, in our preferred
specication, multi-collinearity between the regressors is reduced to the largest possible
extent.
7Another strand of research includes market potential { i.e., some inverse-trade-cost-
weighted average of market size of other regions as a determinant of rm location (see
6Research at the aggregate level has further pointed to the role of physical
capital for MNEs' plant set-up (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Since
data on capital stocks are not available at the regional level, the best we
can do to proxy for capital is to include log gross investment share (in total
expenditures) of a municipality. In line with previous theoretical work, we
expect that larger gross investments { reecting bigger local stocks of capital
in equilibrium { positively aect the inclination of foreign MNEs to locate
their regional headquarters in a municipality. For similar reasons, we include
the fraction of land area covered with infrastructure (buildings and streets).
Finally, we may be concerned about structural dierences between West-
ern and Eastern German municipalities in their ability to attract foreign
MNEs' headquarters. To capture the latter, we include an indicator variable
which takes a value of zero for municipalities in the former Western Germany
and a value of one for municipalities in the New L ander.8 Since the available
infrastructure in Germany's New L ander was and still is of a lower quality,
on average, in the sample period, we expect the parameter of this variable
to take a negative sign.
3 Data
The data on the count of multinational rms per municipality come from
Deutsche Bundesbank's Micro-Database Direct Investment (MiDi). All Ger-
man rms with a balance sheet total of more than 3 million Euros in which
foreign investors hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights are required
by law to report to the Deutsche Bundesbank balance sheet information as
well as information on the sector, legal form, and number of employees.9 In-
Head and Mayer, 2004). However, we employ such a population-based variable as an
instrument for business tax rates in some of the empirical models. The respective tests do
not reject this choice as compared against a model which includes weighted population of
neighboring regions as a direct determinant of the number of foreign MNE headquarters
located in a municipality.
8Overall, Germany consists of 16 L ander. Of those, the following 11 are located in the
former Western German part of the country (the Old L ander): Baden-W urttemberg, Bay-
ern, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-
Pfalz, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. The following 5 L ander are located in the for-
mer Eastern German part of the country (the New L ander): Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Th uringen.
9The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
Reporting thresholds have been changed in the past, for details and a documentation on
7direct participating interests are to be reported whenever nonresidents hold
more than 50% in a domestic rm and these dependent enterprises themselves
hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights in other domestic enterprises.
An appealing feature of this data-set is that it comprises the universe of in-
ward FDI (above the reporting threshold) undertaken in Germany. For each
of these enterprises, we have information about the municipality where their
German headquarters are located.10
Municipality-level data on the qualication of employees were compiled
on special request based on the universe of German social-security records of
the German Federal Labor Agency (Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit). The obser-
vations are the universe of workers registered for unemployment insurance,
representing around 80% of the German workforce.11 Our skill measure is
the share of workers with tertiary school education.
Municipality-level data on business tax rates, population, geographical
area, the independency ratio, the fraction of land area covered with build-
ings and streets (a measure of available infrastructure), and gross investments
are provided by dierent federal statistical oces of the 16 German states
(L ander) in the database Statistik Lokal distributed by the German Statis-
tical Oce (Statistisches Bundesamt).
As mentioned before, there are two advantages of looking at location
choices at the sub-national level. One is that rms face a much more homo-
geneous institutional setting across municipalities within a country than at
the international level. Another advantage of using sub-national data is that
one may account more accurately for the heterogeneity of locations. Cross-
country data use national averages that might suer from aggregation bias.12
the micro-level data set MiDi see Lipponer (2008).
10In fact, the information contained in the data-set does not identify individual sub-
sidiaries but refers to regional headquarters which may report data on several of their
subsidiaries. These headquarters may be responsible for a production facility at the same
location or a set of subsidiaries in Germany. This is not of importance here, since we
focus on regional headquarters location and the number of such entities (rather than em-
ployees, turnover, etc.; the latter would be impossible to assign to headquarters versus
subsidiaries).
11Coverage includes full- and part-time workers of private enterprises, apprentices, and
other trainees, as well as temporarily suspended employment relationships. Civil servants,
student workers, and self-employed individuals are excluded and make up the remaining
20% of the formal-sector labor force.
12Consider two countries A and B with identical national averages. For instance, country
A might have a skilled labor force but a bad infrastructure in one half of the country
8By looking at the smallest regional unit (municipalities), aggregation bias is
ruled out.
German municipalities have autonomy in determining the local business
tax rate, while the tax base is dened by the federal tax law which applies
uniformly in all municipalities.13 Prot-shifting between plants in an at-
tempt to escape the local business tax is avoided by formula apportionment:
rm prots to be taxed are apportioned to each municipality according to
the share of payroll paid there.14 We expect headquarters to represent an
important share of total payroll, so that the local business tax rate is an
important determinant in the location decision of headquarters.
In Germany, there are over 12,000 municipalities. For 11,094 of these,
we have a panel data set of the dependent and explanatory variables over
the period 2001 to 2005 with at least two consecutive observations in the
sample period. For the cross-section in year 2005, we have data on 11,208
municipalities.15 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the municipal data
for 2005. In that year, only 1,674 municipalities { or 14% { hosted foreign
MNE headquarters.
{ Table 1 {
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the number of MNE headquarters across
all municipalities in 2005. Whereas 86% of the municipalities did not host a
single MNE headquarters, six municipalities (Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt,
D usseldorf, Berlin and Cologne) hosted more than 200 each. Altogether, the
latter six municipalities hosted almost one third of all foreign headquarters
in Germany in that year. Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution
of MNE headquarters.
and a good infrastructure but unskilled labor in the other half of the country. Country
B, in contrast, might have both skilled labor and a good infrastructure in one half of the
country and neither skilled labor nor a good infrastructure in the other half of the country.
These sub-national dierences might matter for aggregate outcomes, but are washed out
in national aggregates.
13There have been reforms about business tax law across the years. However, no such
change has been undertaken in the period we consider here (2001-2005).
14See the German business tax law, in particular, x29 GewStG (Gewerbesteuergesetz).
15The dierence between the total number of more than 12,000 municipalities and the
smaller ones in the panel and cross-section accrues to lacking data on some of the explana-
tory variables for municipalities in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (except for the
seven Kreisfreie St adte { i.e., larger cities { in that state: Greifswald, Neubrandenburg,
Rostock, Schwerin, Stralsund, and Wismar).
9{ Figures 1 and 2 {
Let us rst consider the simple correlation between the presence of lo-
cal MNE headquarters and the business tax rate in German municipalities
unconditional on other determinants of location. For this, let us use the cross-
sectional data of 2005 and illustrate the relationship between the number of
MNE headquarters and the business tax rate in simple scatter plots.
{ Figures 3a and 3b {
In Figure 3a, we consider the relationship for all municipalities. In Figure
3b, we illustrate it only for municipalities with a positive number of head-
quarters. Obviously, irrespective of which of the two gures we look at, the
unconditional relationship is positive. Do municipalities with higher busi-
ness tax rates attract a larger number of foreign headquarters? This sounds
counter-intuitive. However, conditional on other factors { such as the avail-
ability of skilled workers, region size, a relatively large fraction of population
in working-age, etc. { high business tax rates may well be harmful for head-
quarters location irrespective of the unconditional relationship in Figures 3a
and 3b. We may refer to the source of the positive relationship between
the number of foreign MNE headquarters and the local business tax rate in
Figures 3a and 3b as one of endogeneity of business tax rates { i.e., their cor-
relation with observable or unobservable determinants of the number of MNE
headquarters in a municipality. To shed light on the causal eect of business
tax rates, we now turn to multivariate negative binomial and Poisson model
regressions.
4 Econometric issues
According to the descriptive statistics, the number of foreign MNE headquar-
ters in Germany, our dependent variable, is a count which takes the value
zero in many municipalities. Hence, the distribution function of the depen-
dent variable places probability mass at nonnegative values only. Moreover,
the density function is skewed to the left, and the data are concentrated on
a few small discrete values and intrinsically heteroskedastic with variance
increasing in the mean. This nature of the data likely leads to inconsistent
and certainly to inecient parameter estimates in linear regression models.
10However, such problems can be avoided by means of econometric models for
count data.
The most frequently applied count data model is the Poisson regression
model.16 It is obtained by assuming that each realization of the count depen-
dent variable yi for cross-sectional observation i (in our case, yi would be the
number of headquarters hosted by municipality i) is drawn from a Poisson
distribution with parameter (xi;) = exp(x0
i), where x0
i is a 1  K vector
of explanatory variables and  a K  1 parameter vector to be estimated.















This last feature of the Poisson distribution (referred to as equidispersion, or
equality of mean and variance) renders the Poisson regression model often too
restrictive in applications. In particular, the model tends to under-predict the
frequency of zeros and of large counts for data in which the actual variance is
larger than the mean (referred to as over-dispersion). In our application, we
have both a large number of zeros and a few very large counts so that over-
dispersion is likely a problem. As Figure 1 shows, the tail of the distribution
is very long with 86% of the municipalities hosting no multinational but one
municipality hosting 615 multinationals in 2005.
An approach which is more exible than the Poisson regression model is
the negative binomial model (NB), which allows for unobserved heterogeneity
by treating the parameter  of the Poisson process as a random variable. This
model is obtained by setting i = ii, where i = exp(x0
i), and the random
component i > 0 is gamma-distributed with E(i) = 1 and V ar(i) = .






i) = i(1 + i)
16For a thorough discussion of the count data models discussed in this section, see
Winkelmann (2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (2006).
17The model with this particular parametrization is known as NB type-II model (see
Cameron and Trivedi, 2006).
11thus allowing for over-dispersion and providing a good t to many types of
data.
For data like ours, with 86% of zero observations, zero-inated (ZI) models
{ which assume an extra proportion of zeros additionally to the zero obser-
vations arising from the count data distribution { should t the data even
better. Zeros are allowed to occur as an outcome of two dierent regimes. In
one regime the outcome will always be zero and in the other one the standard
count process is at work resulting in either zero or positive values. The model
combines a binary variable describing the probability of extra zeros with a
standard count variable. The probability function is given by
f(yi) =
(
!i + (1   !i)g(yi = 0) if y = 0 ;
(1   !i)g(yi j yi > 0) if y  1;
where !i can be a logit and g(yi) a Poisson or an NB density. All such
models (including Poisson, NB, and ZI versions thereof) can be estimated
by the maximum likelihood method. In our application, the binary process
reects the economic suitability of a municipality for hosting a multinational
headquarters at all, and the conditional mean of the count process describes
the number of MNE headquarters that are actually attracted given a munic-
ipality's general suitability for headquarters location.
Eventually, one might be worried about business tax rates being endoge-
nous. For instance, this would be the case if the average municipality al-
tered business tax rates to attract foreign headquarters in particular.18 Mul-
lahy (1997) derives moment conditions for generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation of count data models with endogenous regressors and





The following moment restriction follows from the rst-order condition of the
18Notice that this is more than to say that municipalities used business tax rates to
attract rms in general. In our application, the average municipality is not able to attract
any foreign headquarters. This may be seen as an indication that the attraction of foreign
headquarters is not the most important policy objective of the average German munici-
pality. Hence, we expect the endogeneity issue as a subordinate one, here. However, we
mention and apply suitable methods for completeness and as a robustness check to the











This condition holds as long as i is uncorrelated with the regressors x0
i and
E(ijx0
i) = 1.20 Mullahy considers the case where E(ijx0
i) 6= 1 and a vector
of instruments z0
i of dimension 1  P with P  K is available such that
E(ijz0






can be used to consistently estimate the parameter vector . We use Mul-
lahy's approach with cross-sectional data under the assumption of endoge-
nous tax rates.
An alternative approach of addressing the problem of endogeneity arises
with panel data. Windmeijer (2006) discusses moment conditions that can
be used to estimate the parameter vector consistently allowing for correlation
between the individual eects and the regressors under dierent assumptions






where i is an index for municipalities, and t = 1;:::T is an index for time with
T with denoting the maximum number of years of a municipality-specic time
series in the data. i is a time-invariant, unobservable, municipality-specic
component and wit is a time-variant disturbance term. Notice that i and
wit are scaling factors for the municipality-specic mean. With the panel
data models, we allow that that E(xitwit ) 6= 0 for   0, maintaining that
E(witi) = 0, E(wit) = 1 (both of them for t = 1;:::;T) and E(wiswit) = 0
(for any s 6= t).
We apply Chamberlain's (1992) quasi-dierencing transformation to elim-
inate the multiplicative xed eect i. The quasi-dierencing approach is




  yit 1 = it 1i(wit   wit 1)




20Whenever a constant term is included in x0
i, then E(i) = 1 can be assumed without
loss of generality (see Mullahy, 1997).
13with moment conditions
E(sitjzit 1) = E(it 1iE((wit   wit 1)ji;zit 1)jzit 1) = 0;
where zit 1 is a 1  P vector of instruments.
In our empirical analysis, we primarily adopt the assumption that busi-
ness tax rates are exogenous to foreign headquarters location. Moreover, we
mainly exploit variation contained in the cross-section, since the time series
is short for which information about the municipality-level variables is avail-
able for all cross-sectional units (ranging from 2001 to 2005 at most). Over
a short time-span, it is dicult to discern eects of explanatory variables
with small time series variation from xed municipality eects. However, we
apply the above instrumental variable techniques with cross-sectional and
panel data to shed light on the robustness { in qualitative terms { of the
cross-sectional business tax eect on foreign MNE headquarters location.
5 Empirical analysis
We start by estimating models on the cross-sectional data-set and assume
that the N K matrix of explanatory variables includes { apart from TAX
(the log of the business tax rate) { the following variables: SKILL (the log
share of employees with a tertiary education), POPDEN (the log population
density), AREA (the log total area of the municipality in square kilometers),
IDEPRAT (the log independency ratio, dened as the population aged 15-
64 divided by the total population), BUILT (the log fraction of area in
a municipality which is covered by buildings and streets), INV (the log
share of investment expenditures of the municipality in total expenditures),
and EAST (a dummy for municipalities located in the New L ander, i.e., in
the former Eastern German part of the country). Table 2 gives summary
statistics for the covariates included in the analysis.21
In the cross-sectional models, we use two alternative dependent vari-
ables. One measure is the stock of MNEs in a municipality as of 2005 (la-
beled MNE) and the other one the number of new headquarters in 2005
(NEWMNE). The latter may help avoiding a bias of the model parameters
arising from the possible correlation between the tax rate of a municipality in
21The statistics correspond to the pooled observations over the period 2001-2005. The
statistics for the cross section of 2005 are virtually identical.
14a given year and the number of MNEs located in the municipality in previous
years.22 Of course, NEWMNE has a much larger number of zero entries
than MNE, so using NB or ZI-type models as compared to simple Pois-
son regressions is even more important with NEWMNE. We generally use
once-lagged values of the explanatory variables in the econometric models.
Hence, we employ values for 2004 on the right-hand side of all cross-sectional
models. This is to avoid any bias associated with contemporaneous shocks in
the dependent and the explanatory variables. Since all explanatory variables
except for EAST are in logs, the associated parameters can be interpreted
as elasticities. Table 3 summarizes a set of benchmark regression results.
{ Table 3 {
The numbers in Table 3 indicate that the over-dispersion parameter is
signicantly dierent from zero. Hence, the negative binomial model is bet-
ter suited for the data and specication at hand than the Poisson model (see
Winkelmann, 2003; and Cameron and Trivedi, 2006). With the fairly large
fraction of zeros in the dependent variable, a separate modeling of the zero
threshold is recommended. However, the parameter estimates are fairly sta-
ble qualitatively across the estimated models. Especially, when comparing
the estimates of the negative binomial model with its zero-inated coun-
terpart in Table 3. There, even the 95% condence intervals around the
coecients are overlapping for most of the parameters (except for constant,
POPDEN, and AREA).
The key parameter of interest here is the one of TAX. It turns out that
controlling for the suggested determinants of MNE headquarters location
eliminates (most of) the bias obviously present in the unconditional relation-
ship between MNE and TAX portrayed in Figures 3a and 3b. In Table 3, the
estimated parameter is unambiguously negative and statistically signicantly
dierent from zero at the one percent level in all models employing MNE
as the dependent variable, and also with the NB model for NEWMNE.
The parameter of TAX is signicantly dierent from zero at 10% with the
zero-inated negative binomial (ZINB) regression for NEWMNE.
Note that the eect of TAX on the expected number of headquarters
in a municipality is of considerable magnitude. As mentioned before, the
coecients should be interpreted as elasticities: a one-percent decline in
22We present and discuss estimates based on instrumental variable regressions and panel
data models below.
15TAX is related to an increase in the expected number of headquarters of
between 150% and 450% percent. However, recall that many municipalities
do not attract foreign headquarters at all. So, it is useful to compute the
marginal eect of TAX evaluated at the sample mean.23 We nd that, for
the average municipality, a one-percent reduction of the municipal tax rate
{ which is equivalent to a decline by about 0:14 percentage points { leads to
an increase in the number of headquarters of foreign MNEs by about 0:05 in
the (preferred) ZINB model for NEWMNE in Table 3.
A higher fraction of skilled workers in a municipality raises the number
of MNE headquarters as predicted, e.g., by the knowledge-capital model of
the multinational enterprise (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen,
2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002). Larger regions attract more headquar-
ters as predicted by a variety of models of MNEs (see Markusen, 2002; and
Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). This is reected in the positive coe-
cients for population density (POPDEN) and geographical area (AREA).
Region size should not only matter in terms of geographical area or the num-
ber of potential consumers but also with regard to the size of the available
work force. Hence, not surprisingly, we nd that MNEs tend to locate in those
regions where the fraction of the population of working age (IDEPRAT) is
large.
The coecient of the relative size of the area covered with buildings
and streets (BUILT) suggests that such space is particularly important for
MNE location. After controlling for the latter, the share of investments in
a municipality's total expenditures (INV ) seems to be of minor importance
for MNE headquarters location. Finally, as expected, foreign MNEs are less
inclined to locate their headquarters in the New (formerly Eastern German)
L ander.
5.1 Instrumental variables estimation
The results in Table 3 indicate that conditioning on the included covariates
eliminates a large part of the bias of the TAX parameter contaminating an
23In nonlinear models the partial eect of a variable on the conditional mean of the
dependent variable is a function of the other regressors and parameter estimates as well,
and needs to be evaluated at some value of the covariates. In applied research, it is common
to evaluate marginal eects at the rst moment of the distribution of the covariates, i.e.,
at the sample mean. See the Appendix for the derivation of the marginal eects and their
standard errors for the models estimated in Table 3.
16unconditional relationship between TAX and MNE. However, there may be
some endogeneity left, and this could be particularly important in the cross-
sectional models employing MNE rather than NEWMNE. For instance,
such a bias would arise from tax competition between municipalities in order
to attract foreign MNE headquarters. The source of the bias would be a
correlation of the explanatory variables with any possible omitted regressors,
time-variant or time-invariant.
The rst problem can be overcome by means of instrumental variable
count data model regression and the second one by quasi-dierenced count
data model estimation using panel data. The corresponding models are sum-
marized in Table 4. In one of the models, we use the stock of MNE head-
quarters per municipality (MNE) in 2005 with cross-sectional instrumental
variable GMM estimation (IV-GMM). With appropriate instruments, IV-
GMM may overcome the bias associated with the omission of time-variant
or time-invariant variables from the model. Alternatively, we employ panel
data and quasi-dierenced GMM estimation.24
{ Table 4 {
Theoretical work on spatial tax competition suggests that a jurisdiction's
tax rate is a function of both local and other jurisdictions' characteristics.
Strategic interaction among jurisdictions suggests that jurisdictions set their
tax rate in response to the one(s) applied in neighboring jurisdictions. In
equilibrium, tax rates in all jurisdictions are determined by economic fun-
damentals (such as region size, factor endowments, etc.). Accordingly, a
large fraction of empirical work addresses the problem of tax competition by
means of instrumental variables regressions where weighted tax rates of other
municipalities are modeled as a function of weighted economic fundamentals
there (see Brett and Pinkse, 2000; Egger, Pfaermayr, and Winner, 2005a,b).
In a reduced form, local tax rates are a function of economic fundamentals of
the local jurisdiction and weighted tax rates of the \neighbors". We use the
latter idea to instrument municipality-level tax rates with average charac-
teristics of neighboring municipalities. In the cross section, the instruments
used are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets,
24Neither for IV-GMM nor for quasi-dierenced GMM did the estimation procedure
converge when using NEWMNE instead of MNE as the dependent variable. The rea-
son for this is to be seen in the extremely large number of zeros in NEWMNE in any
considered year.
17the total area, and the share of agricultural area (all in logs) for (i) all mu-
nicipalities within a radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given
municipality and for (ii) all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km
from the center of a given municipality. In the panel estimation we use the
averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets, the share of
agricultural area, the independency ratio, and the skilled labor share for all
neighboring municipalities within a 50 km radius.25
The rst column summarizes the ndings based on an instrumental vari-
able count data model for the cross-sectional data-set of 2005. Results are
based on the GMM routine described in Section 4.26 The instruments are rel-
evant and pass the over-identication test. The parameters of TAX, SKILL
and POPDEN as well as the variables BUILT and AREA exhibit the same
sign as in Table 3 and are statistically signicant. The remaining variables
turn out to be insignicant under IV-GMM. As expected, the parameter
estimate of TAX is negative and higher in absolute value than in the bench-
mark models in Table 3. If some remaining endogeneity were to bias the
coecients in Table 3 downwards in absolute value (i.e. towards the uncon-
ditional relationship in Figures 3a and 3b), we would expect an instrumental
variables model to raise the point estimate as compared to the models in
Table 3. If the origin of the bias was mainly due to the omission of rel-
evant time-invariant variables, we would expect the bias in Table 3 to be
larger when using the stock of MNE headquarters (MNE) rather than new
headquarters (NEWMNE) as the dependent variable. Indeed, it turns out
25All instruments are measured in logs. Notice that the list of instruments is slightly
dierent between the cross-sectional and the panel data models. The reason is that we may
only exploit information from time-variant instruments in the panel model. For instance,
AREA and EAST do not vary across the years and can not be used as instruments in
the panel data models. With panel data, we use a municipality's share of area devoted to
agriculture instead of AREA. This variable exhibits some time variation and is orthogonal
enough to BUILT over time to include it separately (by way of contrast, the two variables
are highly correlated cross-sectionally and should not be included in the models together
in Table 3 to avoid eciency losses associated with irrelevant instruments). Moreover,
weighted characteristics within a radius of 25 kilometers are strongly correlated over time
with the ones within a radius of 50 kilometers over time. So we exclude the former and
only use the latter in the panel models.
26Notice that the econometric model requires the endogenous variable to be unlimited
in its value range. Obviously, this is not the case for TAX. Using logistically transformed
business tax rates (TAXLOG = ln([tax rate]=[1 tax rate])) ensures that the endogenous
variable (TAXLOG) is unlimited. However, it turns out that the results are very similar
in a model which employs TAX instead of TAXLOG.
18that the instrumental variables model leads to a parameter estimate of TAX
which is closer to the NEWMNE-based estimates in Table 3 than to the
MNE-based ones. The dierence between the parameter for TAX in the
ZINB model of Table 3 and the IV-GMM model in Table 4 is not statistically
signicant at commonly used levels of signicance.
The second column in Table 4 reports estimates based on the quasi-
dierenced GMM estimator derived in Windmeijer (2006). We use the in-
struments as described before and in the table footnote. However, we elim-
inate the time-invariant variables EAST and AREA from this regression.
It turns out that the parameter of TAX is signicantly dierent from zero
and exhibits the same sign as in the benchmark regressions of Table 3. The
estimated elasticity of the number of MNEs with respect to TAX is much
bigger than before. However, the condence interval is larger, too.27 So,
we take the results from the quasi-dierences GMM estimator mainly as in
indication that the qualitative ndings about a signicant negative eect of
higher business tax rates on the location of foreign MNE headquarters in
Germany are robust.
Overall, our ndings suggest that a marginal reduction of business tax
rates in the average municipality is not enough to attract foreign MNE head-
quarters. Municipality size and the availability of workers, especially skilled
workers, are important. Only those municipalities which have a suciently
attractive environment to be on the map of foreign MNEs when planning to
locate subsidiaries in Germany will be able to attract foreign headquarters
by reasonable reductions in their tax rates. Municipalities with less favor-
able environments would have to trade these o with sizable reductions in
the business tax rate. For instance, the estimates in Table 3 imply that a
one-percent reduction in business tax rates increases the number of foreign
MNE headquarters in a region by about 0:05. Hence, the preferred model
indicates that the average municipality has to reduce its tax rate by about
20% (or 2:8 percentage points) to attract a single foreign headquarters. The
average municipality may not want to do so, since the associated losses in
tax income from national rms may easily outweigh the expected raise of tax
27As mentioned before, we do not see the panel model results as the most reliable ones.
The reason is that there is little variation in tax rates and numbers of headquarters per
municipality on average over the short time span covered by the data. To be more specic,
4,080 municipalities changed their tax rate at least once during that time span but in only
345 of those did the number of MNE headquarters actually change (increase or decline).
Hence, the TAX parameter is identied from a fairly small fraction of observations.
19income collected from the foreign MNE.
In comparison to work at the aggregated (country-pair) level, the esti-
mated business tax elasticities on foreign investments are very high (see de
Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006, 2009, for an overview). However, it is well
documented that elasticities estimated from sub-national data are higher
than those obtained at the aggregate level (see Slemrod, 1990; Hines, 1996,
for examples and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, for pointing to this fact).
One fundamental dierence between most of the work on prot taxes on
foreign direct investment and ours is that we focus entirely on the exten-
sive margin in terms of numbers of regional MNE headquarters. Work on
the tax responsiveness of foreign direct investment at the aggregate (coun-
try or country-pair) level in general tends to mix eects on the extensive
margin (i.e., on lumpy investment) and the intensive margin. And, nally,
even though the elasticities are high, the average German municipality needs
to change its business tax rate quite dramatically to become attractive to
foreign investors at all.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence on the impact of prot taxation for the location
of regional headquarters of foreign MNEs using data for more than 11;000
German municipalities. We link data on local public nance and other mu-
nicipality characteristics available from the German Statistical Oce and the
Federal Employment Agency with rm-level data from the German Central
Bank about inbound foreign direct investments in Germany for the years
2001-2005.
One advantage of this data-set is that institutional characteristics and the
taxation of other factors are much more homogeneous across municipalities
within a country than in cross-country studies. Moreover, the number of
municipalities foreign MNEs may locate in is larger by more than one order
of magnitude than the number of countries for which prot taxes are typically
available. So, the impact of prot taxes on MNE headquarters location may
be identied much more precisely than in an international context.
Overall, we nd that the business tax rate levied by a municipality nega-
tively aects the number of MNEs it can attract. This impact is found after
controlling for other important determinants of a foreign MNE's location
decision. Irrespective of whether we assume that business tax rates are en-
20dogenous or not, the impact of business tax rates is of reasonable magnitude.
The average German municipality was not able to attract any foreign head-
quarters at all over the years covered by our data. Such a municipality would
have to lower its business tax rate by about twenty percent (or 2:8 percentage
points) to lure a foreign MNE into its jurisdiction, according to our results.
It is very likely that the associated gains in taxes collected from the foreign
MNE would be lower than the losses the average municipality encountered
from foregone business tax revenues collected from national enterprises.
Obviously, most municipalities do not nd this attractive, since foreign
capital is not the only important tax base to consider. However, larger mu-
nicipalities with an abundant workforce, especially of skilled workers, may
attract foreign MNE headquarters by much smaller changes in their tax rates.
Implicitly, these results suggest that municipalities with generally favorable
environments for rm location should be able to use their tax rates more
successfully to attract foreign MNEs than those with less favorable environ-
ments.
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25Appendix
Marginal eects in count data models
The marginal eect of any explanatory variable xij on the conditional mean


















for the zero-inated negative binomial model, in the case where the vector
of explanatory variables x0
i is identical in the ination model and the main
equation. The marginal eects depend on the explanatory variables and need
to be evaluated at some value. We evaluate them at the sample mean.
The standard errors of the marginal eects were computed according to
the asymptotic variance formulas
Asy:V ar[^ ]NB = (exp( x
0^ ))
2[Ik + exp( x
0^ )^  x
0]V [Ik + exp( x
0^ ) x^ 
0]
and
Asy:V ar[^ ]ZINB = [(1   )]
2[Ik + (1   2)^  x
0]V [Ik + (1   2) x^ 
0]
where  x is the K1 vector of sample means, ^  is the K1 vector of parameter
estimates, Ik is an identity matrix of dimension K, V is the KK estimated
asymptotic covariance matrix of ^  and  = exp( x0^ )=(1 + exp( x0^ )) is a
scalar.
26Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Business tax rate 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.31
General Expenditures 16,198.13 248,476 15.57 21,800,000
Investment Expenditure 1,449.84 9,160.54 0 519,200
Population 7.03 45.45 0.005 3,395.18
Skilled labor share 0.06 0.03 0.003 0.59
Area covered with buildings and streets 3.79 10.68 0.01 619.28
Total area 28.27 35.08 0.4 891.82
Note: Statistics refer to 11,208 German municipalities in 2005. Expenditures in 1,000 Eu-
ros. Population in 1,000. Area in km2. Sources: German Federal Labor Agency, Statistik
Lokal, Ed. 2003-07, and Statistical oces of Berlin-Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg and
Sachsen-Anhalt.
Table 2: Included covariates
Variable Denition Mean Std. dev.
TAX ln (taxrate)  1:96 0.10
SKILL ln (share of employees with tertiary education)  2:92 0.46
POPDEN ln (total population / total area) 0.01 1.01
AREA ln (total area) 7.42 1.02
IDEPRAT ln (population aged 15-65 / total population)  0:40 0.05
BUILT ln (area covered with buildings and streets / total area)  2:32 0.56
INV ln (investment expenditure / total expenditure)  1:96 0.88
EAST Dummy for East Germany 0.26 0.44
Note: Panel of 11,094 municipalities with at least two consecutive observations over the
period 2001-2005.
27Table 3: Cross section 2005
Zero-Inated
Negative Binomial Negative Binomial
Indep. variables MNE NEWMNE MNE NEWMNE
TAX -2.514*** -2.594*** -1.571*** -4.578*
(0.332) (0.894) (0.448) (2.482)
SKILL 0.612*** 1.296*** 0.775*** 1.016***
(0.069) (0.179) (0.084) (0.351)
POPDEN 1.115*** 0.873*** 0.621*** 0.982
(0.099) (0.279) (0.122) (0.717)
AREA 1.198*** 1.024*** 0.797*** 0.899***
(0.032) (0.079) (0.051) (0.256)
IDEPRAT 1.727** 3.936 2.044 7.273*
(0.873) (2.73) (1.254) (3.759)
BUILT 0.762*** 0.932* 0.732*** 0.324
(0.167) (0.480) (0.189) (0.819)
INV  0:002 0.02  0:09 0.051
(0.042) (0.133) (0.055) (0.301)
EAST  0:789***  1:033***  1:178***  1:856***
(0.124) (0.327) (0.132) (0.521)
constant  12:24***  10:65***  5:77***  12:84
(1.061) (2.723) (1.37) (8.04)
 1.12 1.852 0.648 1.10
(0.079) (0.391) (0.087) (0.193)
Wald test (2) 4909.2 1001.6 1328.43 125.7
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo log-likelihood  5676:71  932:82  5571:01  916:93
Observations 11208 11208 11208 11208
Nonzero obs. 1631 229 1631 229
Marginal eect
of TAX  0:17***  0:008***  0:22***  0:05*
(0.02) (0.003) (0.06) (0.02)
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
2. All explanatory variables are in logs and lagged once (i.e. the values are for 2004).
3. The ination model of the Zero-Inated Negative Binomial model is a logit, the regres-
sors are the same as in the main specication. Results available upon request.
4. Marginal eect evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors in parentheses, for
the derivation see appendix. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
28Table 4: TAX Instrumented: year 2005
Dependent variable: MNE


























Notes: 1. All explanatory variables in logs. For the cross-section explanatory variables
are lagged once (i.e. the values are for 2004).
2. The cross section IV regression uses Mullahy's (1997) multiplicative moment conditions
and the panel IV regression uses Chamberlain's (1992) transformation for the multiplica-
tive error specication as detailed in the main text.
3. The instruments used in the cross section are the averages of the share of area covered
with buildings and streets, the total area, and the share of agricultural area (all in logs)
for (i) all municipalities within a radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given
municipality and for (ii) all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center
of a given municipality. In the panel estimation we use the averages of the share of area
covered with buildings and streets, the share of agricultural area, the independency ratio,
and the skilled labor share for all neighboring municipalities within a 50 km radius.
4. One-Step results. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.86 % Zero Observations
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